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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE REDUCTION OF REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY:
EVIDENCE FROM TRANSFER PRICING POLICY

ANDREW B. WHITFORD*
INTRODUCTION
A number of recent studies have centered on regulatory uncertainty as a
concern for those worried about how government intervenes in the economy.1
Likewise, studies in finance and economics show that firms and investors do
(or that they should) account for regulatory uncertainty when maximizing
gains or managing share value in markets.2 Both streams of research see the
regulatory state as part of the firms’ external environment for which firms must
account when making capital investments or deciding whether to enter
markets.3 A long literature in management studies presumes that firms
strategically adapt to regulatory uncertainty and that they try to use public
policy to shape that environment.4 Recently, business leaders have focused on

* Professor of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public & International Affairs, the
University of Georgia.
1. Leisha DeHart-Davis & Barry Bozeman, Regulatory Compliance and Air Quality
Permitting: Why Do Firms Overcomply?, 11 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 471 (2001); Chris
Koski & Peter J. May, Interests and Implementation: Fostering Voluntary Regulatory Actions, 16
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 329 (2005); Alan L. Olmstead & Paul W. Rhode, The
“Tuberculosis Cattle Trust”: Disease Contagion in an Era of Regulatory Uncertainty, 64 J.
ECON. HIST. 929 (2004).
2. George Bittlingmayer, Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from Antitrust
Enforcement, 20 CATO J. 295 (2001); Roger Buckland & Patricia Fraser, Political and Regulatory
Risk: Beta Sensitivity in U.K. Electricity Distribution, 19 J. REG. ECON. 5 (2001); E.R. Larsen &
D.W. Bunn, Deregulation in Electricity: Understanding Strategic and Regulatory Risk, 50 J.
OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y 337 (1999); Claudio Morana & John W. Sawkins, Regulatory
Uncertainty and Share Price Volatility: the English and Welsh Water Industry’s Periodic Price
Review, 17 J. REG. ECON. 87 (2000).
3. See sources cited supra notes 1–2.
4. Philip H. Birnbaum, The Choice of Strategic Alternatives Under Increasing Regulation
in High Technology Companies, 27 ACAD. MGMT. J. 489 (1984); Nancy M. Carter, Small Firm
Adaptation: Responses of Physicians’ Organizations to Regulatory and Competitive Uncertainty,
33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 307 (1990); Brian Shaffer, Firm-level Responses to Government Regulation:
Theoretical and Research Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495 (1995).
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regulatory uncertainty and risk as a key decision environment—one that can
make or break both companies and their leaders.5
One reason that firms focus on regulatory uncertainty or risk is that capital
investment decisions are long-term decisions.6 Firms seek to evaluate the size,
timing, and risk of future cash flows.7 In the end, efficient investment depends
on the manager’s ability to distinguish between investment opportunities and
the manager’s investment incentives.8 While having developed financial
markets seems to improve the allocation of capital,9 business investment is
unpredictable and difficult to explain.10 In practice, many of the key financial
factors still leave a great deal of variation in investment unexplained.11 Studies
in economics and finance see regulatory uncertainty and risk as a major source
of that variation.12
I focus in this paper on the conditions under which governments seek to
reduce regulatory uncertainty. Regulatory uncertainty and regulatory risk are
states of the world that governments might seek to mitigate. This paper
concentrates on multinational companies (MNCs) that seek to transfer goods
and services across international borders. Multidivisional firms often use
pricing systems for the transfer of such goods and services; this coordination
mechanism can be problematic when divisions engage in cross-border
transactions, if governments regulate the flow of taxable revenue across
borders.13 As a recent report of PricewaterhouseCoopers noted:
A major and growing problem for the directors of multinationals is the issue of
preparing documentation to demonstrate compliance with transfer pricing
rules. More and more countries have established documentation rules that

5. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE ECONOMIST, REGULATORY RISK: TRENDS AND
STRATEGIES FOR THE CRO 2 (2005), available at http://www.aceeuropeangroup.com/NR/
rdonlyres/9602658F-7C1C-4169-AEA5-E207EEA2CA21/0/CRO_RISK_REPORT.pdf.
6. See Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Capital Investment Strategies Under Uncertain
Regulation, 24 RAND J. ECON. 591, 593 (1993).
7. See generally STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1996)
(outlining procedures for evaluating future cash flows).
8. See Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON.
187, 187–89 (2000) (arguing that agency theories suggest “pressures from external investors, as
well as managerial ownership, encourage managers to pursue value-maximizing investment
policies,” but that when the resources are owned by the state, political motivations and infrequent
checks in the system do not encourage managers to work towards efficiency).
9. Id. at 198.
10. Murray Z. Frank & Vidhan K. Goyal, Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are
Reliably Important?, 38 FIN. MGMT. 1, 2–5 (2009).
11. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 295.
12. Donald P. Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 874, 881 (2002).
13. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING 2008 1 (2008),
available at http://pwccn.com/webmedia/doc/633542361212701566_tp_intl_2008.pdf.
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require companies to state clearly and with supporting evidence why their
14
transfer pricing policies comply with the arm’s-length standard.

Predictably, firms face significant uncertainty about how governments view
these transactions, a typical standard being whether the price is consistent with
an arm’s length transaction (with the price that would be consistent left
unstated).15 The economics literature on transfer pricing is usually technical in
nature,16 yet the applied literature (written from the perspective of top
accounting firms) mostly concerns how firms can reduce regulatory risk.17
Specifically, I address the conditions under which countries reduce firm
uncertainty over how tax authorities regulate future transactions. Some
countries adopt “Advance Pricing Agreements” or “Advance Pricing
Arrangements” (APAs) providing for agreements between a taxpayer and the
tax authority that a range of prices will be recognized as “arm’s length”;18
APAs reduce the risks that firms will be assessed future payments.19 This
paper empirically assesses the choice by countries to limit this type of
regulatory uncertainty, and thus, fills a gap in the literature from political
science, economics, and management. No known study addresses the
conditions under which countries will reduce regulatory uncertainty; this paper
is the first to address the underlying mechanisms that support government
choices to limit this uncertainty.
Using data from 2005, I observe the dependent variable of whether a
country’s tax authority is authorized to negotiate binding APAs.20 I model this
policy adoption as a function of the country’s legal origins, the structure of the
tax regime and its impact on government revenues, the country’s participation
in the international Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), and the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) both into and out of
the country. I account for limitations in my sample and the limited nature of
my dependent variable by first estimating a logit model and then assessing the
14. Id. at ii.
15. Id. at 1, 4.
16. See Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multinational
Corporate Decision Making, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 285, 285 (1991) (addressing corporate
decision making by examining 1982 data from thirty-three countries); Jack Hirshleifer, On the
Economics of Transfer Pricing, 29 J. BUS. 172, 172 (1956) (arguing that market price is the
correct transfer price only where the product being transferred is produced in a competitive
environment).
17. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at 1.
18. Id. at viii.
19. Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing Agreements
and the Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 165–66
(2000).
20. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, KMPG INT’L, GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING
REVIEW 2–4 (2005), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~bodnarg/courses/readings/
KPMGGlobalTransferPricingReview_2005.pdf.
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model’s robustness using a trimming estimator for the linear probability
model.21
The analysis first demonstrates that both inward and outward FDI flows
increase the likelihood of a country adopting an APA and thus reducing
regulatory uncertainty. However, I also find that the impact of FDI flows out
of the country is substantially greater than those into the country. Second, I
find that countries are more likely to reduce regulatory uncertainty by adopting
an APA mechanism when they have high corporate tax rates; the impact of
corporate tax rates is also substantially higher than that for inward FDI flows.
While my results initially appear to support the finding that OECD countries
are less likely to offer the APA mechanism, the trimming estimator shows that
this result is not robust. In contrast to the broad literature on endogenous
growth theory and new political economy,22 I find no evidence that countries
with English legal origins are more likely to offer the APA mechanism to
countries facing regulation of their transfer pricing practices.
In the next section, I offer a short description of the causal story about why
countries try to reduce regulatory uncertainty through the use of APA-like
mechanisms. In the third section, I provide a longer description of how
transfer pricing and APAs solve specific problems for firms trying to manage
their taxes. I then present my hypotheses and model specification. After that, I
discuss the estimation strategy and the results from the statistical analysis.
Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings for the study of regulatory
uncertainty, case, and test.
I. REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY AS A CONCERN OF FIRMS
One broadly overlooked aspect of the modern regulatory state is its ability
to limit or expand the uncertainty that firms face when they compete in market
environments. The modern state has evolved to the point where its institutions
can shape fundamental decisions23—not just how to produce goods and
services or how to employ labor and distribute the benefits of production, but
even whether to produce at all. Firms make fundamental capital investment
decisions, such as where to invest, how much to invest, and where to locate
facilities. These capital investment decisions are often made on the basis of
21. William C. Horrace & Ronald L. Oaxaca, Results on the Bias and Inconsistency of
Ordinary Least Squares for the Linear Probability Model, 90 ECON. LETTERS 321, 321–22
(2006).
22. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131
(1997) [hereinafter Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants]; Rafael La Porta et al., The
Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 222–24 (1999) [hereinafter Rafael La Porta et
al., Quality of Government].
23. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (James Alt & Douglass C. North eds., Cambridge Ser., Political Econ. of
Institutions & Decisions, 1991).
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sound business fundamentals: the cost of investment, the demand for their
goods, and investors’ demand for assets. For example, firms may expand
capital investment if low interest rates indicate a lower cost of investment and,
thus, higher expected returns, if strong demand suggests greater profits or if
investors have a greater taste for particular sectors’ investment opportunities.24
Sound fundamentals (or at least the broader business environment) help
determine whether businesses go down this road.
At the same time, firms worldwide regularly make decisions under varying
conditions of political uncertainty: How secure are property rights? Are
contracts enforceable? How difficult is it to repatriate profits or shift currency
given changes in national monetary policy? The credibility of these political
institutions fundamentally shapes the ability of firms to make capital
investment decisions, and accordingly, for developing economies to grow and
flourish.25
Similarly, firms face significant regulatory uncertainty when aspects of
regulatory or taxation policy lower investment returns, or at least make it
difficult to set expectations about what those returns will be.26 Regulatory
uncertainty may come in the form of variations in antitrust policy with changes
in administration27 or environmental policy due to changes in social tastes for
protection.28 This paper centers on a second type of regulatory uncertainty:
when the state, through taxation policy, tries to shape how firms distribute their
profits. Firms make capital investment decisions based in part on profit
expectations; states construct tax policies in part on their expectations of how
those profits will be distributed. With this knowledge, firms can make choices
to reduce that tax burden. In turn, states can adapt their policies to reflect
firms’ minimization efforts. In the end, regulatory uncertainty comes to rank
with other business factors in shaping how firms allocate goods and services
across multiple markets.
Political uncertainty poses significant risk to business investments on many
levels. “In extreme cases, a shift in the political climate will threaten property
rights, the enforceability of contracts, the repatriation of profits, and the
integrity of the monetary standard.”29 While the political environment in the

24. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 295.
25. See NORTH, supra note 23, at 8 (arguing that the structure created by the Constitution
and the Northwest Ordinance encouraged investment in early America); Douglass C. North &
Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing
Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 810–11 (1989)
(describing how the monarchy’s system of forced loans, uncertain repayment schedules, and
grants of monopoly discouraged new investment in the late 1600s).
26. See Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 312.
27. Id. at 298.
28. Koski & May, supra note 1, at 332.
29. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 295–96.
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United States has been relatively stable, shifts in the regulatory framework and
environmental and labor law have affected investments.30
Although the idea of political uncertainty affecting the business climate is
highly intriguing, it has been largely ignored in business cycle literature.31
Mainly because of the difficulty in measuring uncertainty, the concept of
uncertainty affecting investment has generated very little empirical work.32
One significant example of a paper in this area is George Bittlingmayer’s
“Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from Antitrust
Enforcement.”33 This paper uses antitrust enforcement as a measure of policy
uncertainty by focusing on the background of United States antitrust
enforcement in the twentieth century.34 Antitrust enforcement often has a
significant political component, so it offers a possible measure of uncertaintyBittlingmayer presents the links between
causing economic policy.35
investment and antitrust at three levels: certainty, a stable switch in antitrust
policy, and the effects of increased enforcement on uncertainty.36 Antitrust is a
relatively easily measured signal for a broader spectrum of business regulation.
He uses data for twenty-one major industry groups over the period 1947–1991
with plant and equipment investment, GDP, and case filings against exchangelisted firms.37 Bittlingmayer’s “statistical results are based on a version of
widely used investment models, augmented with measures of antitrust
enforcement.”38 “[T]he results support the view that major changes in
[antitrust] policy provide a laboratory to study its effects.”39 One actual effect
of antitrust in practice is to limit investment.40 However, since periods of
antitrust enforcement often coincide with increases in government and business
conflict, antitrust enforcement acts as a signal rather than an isolated variable.41
Few research studies have assessed the importance of regulatory
uncertainty, although it is key to understanding today’s global business
environment. It may be desirable to restrict regulatory commitment power to
prevent a dishonest regulator from causing long-term harm, but that does not
tell us how variations in expectations about honest behavior by regulators

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 296
Id. at 295–96.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 295.
Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 296–97.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 298.
Id.
Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 322.
Id.
See id. at 297.
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affect firm decisions and performance.42 It is possible to address regulatory
uncertainty from a comparative institutional analysis perspective by focusing
on the means for restraining regulatory discretion in the context of particular
countries’ political systems,43 but that does not help us understand the
conditions under which most political systems try to reduce uncertainty. For
instance, while one important study uses regulatory decision data to infer the
regulator’s implicit preferences,44 we have little understanding about how
uncertainty about those preferences can affect the behavior of firms. Likewise,
while a real-options model of investment by a regulated firm shows that
regulatory uncertainty has a considerable impact on investment decisions, that
type of evidence is largely drawn from a theoretical model about the behavior
of firms in markets.45 Finally, while even in the United States there are
reputational spillovers within a given regulatory jurisdiction,46 we still lack
detailed knowledge about rules that reduce uncertainty and the conditions
under which they emerge.47
In contrast, while there is relatively little literature on regulatory
uncertainty, there is a vast array of regulatory literature on regulatory capture,
regulatory opportunism, and multiple firm regulation. It is clear that one
primary source of regulatory uncertainty is the possibility of regulators using
their positions of authority to favor one firm over another.48 Future
employment opportunities within the regulated industry may influence

42. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Should Governments Commit?, 36 EUR. ECON.
REV. 345, 347, 352–53 (1992) (empirically examining the role of corrupt versus non-corrupt
government officials as corporate regulators and evaluating how that affects government
incentives).
43. See DAVID G. NEWBERY, PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, AND REGULATION OF
NETWORK UTILITIES: THE WALRAS-PARETO LECTURES 22–23 (2d prtg. 2000) (comparing
regulation of public utilities in Britain and the United States in the latter half of the twentieth
century and speculating on the political causes of the differences between the two countries).
44. See Daniel McFadden, The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy:
Empirical Evidence, 7 BELL J. ECON. 55, 56 (1976); Daniel McFadden, The Revealed
Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Theory, 6 BELL J. ECON. 401, 402 (1975).
45. See Teisberg, supra note 6, at 592 (theorizing about factors that go into utilities’
decision-making process).
46. See Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Mayo, Regulatory Opportunism and Investment
Behavior: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry, 36 RAND J. ECON. 628, 629–30
(2005) (describing conflicting reports of reputational spillovers as a response to hindsight
regulation in energy utilities).
47. Thomas P. Lyon & Jing Li, Regulatory Uncertainty and Regulatory Scope 1, 3 (July 11,
2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Michigan), available at http://web
user.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/Lyon%20and%20Li%20Regulatory%20Uncertainty.pdf.
48. See David Martimort, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and
Transaction Costs, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 929, 930–31 (1999).
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regulators’ decisions.49 The regulator tends to become more fully captured
over time,50 although competition between two regulators with overlapping
responsibilities can deter regulatory capture.51 Even so, firms are uncertain of
the regulators’ preferences and focus on the danger of regulators catering to
consumer interests,52 mostly because regulators may emphasize consumer
interests, and this “regulatory opportunism may undermine investment by
regulated firms over time.”53 Individual regulatory bodies may vary in relative
allegiance to consumer interests compared to those in the regulated industry.54
In summary, the purpose of this paper is to assess the way in which
governments try to limit a specific type of broad political uncertainty. Broad
political uncertainty could involve the existence and enforcement of property
rights and contracts, the repatriation of profits, or even monetary policy.55 This
paper centers on how governments might limit different types of regulatory
uncertainty, which might be experienced by firms in the taxation of corporate
income, assets, or profits, and how that taxation could lower investment
returns. Knowing that this can occur, firms can make choices to reduce that
tax burden. Governments may adopt rules to reduce that uncertainty. One
type of rule is a credible commitment to not act in ways that are detrimental to
firms—essentially a tying of one’s hands.56 In the next section, I turn to a
discussion of transfer pricing as a specific legal environment in which
governments might seek to reduce the concern firms have about regulatory
uncertainty.
II. TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
The purpose of this section is to describe transfer pricing and its place in a
system of international commerce populated by MNCs. The literature in this
area is detailed and complex, so I limit the description here to discussions of
transfer pricing as a general business strategy, the consequences of that

49. Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, 26
RAND J. ECON. 378, 379 (1995).
50. Martimort, supra note 48, at 930–31.
51. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, Separation of Regulators Against
Collusive Behavior, 30 RAND J. ECON. 232, 233–35, 257 (1999).
52. Lyon & Li, supra note 47, at 30.
53. Id. See also Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, The Dynamic Efficiency of
Regulatory Constitutions, 25 RAND J. ECON. 538, 538–39 (1994) (discussing the efficacy of
‘used and useful’ standard in determining whether consumers should pay for capital investment
for utilities); David J. Salant & Glenn A. Woroch, Trigger Price Regulation, 23 RAND J. ECON.
29, 29 (1992) (examining the notion that returns on regulatory investments are subject to
opportunistic behavior).
54. Lyon & Li, supra note 47, at 31.
55. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 295–96.
56. See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 42, at 346.
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strategy for tax revenue collection, the debate over various methods of pricing,
and the evolution of APAs as a way to reduce regulatory uncertainty about the
tax treatment of future transactions within a MNC.
Generally, transfer pricing is a core business procedure for MNCs that
operate across borders. Transfer pricing has economic, accounting, and
structural aspects. The esoteric issue of transfer pricing policies of foreign
MNCs was an important issue during the 1992 presidential campaign as
candidates debated whether foreign MNCs pay their fair share of taxes.57 Yet,
such sentiment is not limited to the presidential sphere. In July 1992, Dan
Bucks of the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) testified that the practice of
transfer pricing costs the states and the federal government roughly $37 billion
per year in lost revenue.58 J.J. Pickle, as Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Oversight Subcommittee, argued that transfer pricing abuses led to
seventy percent of foreign MNCs paying no tax in the United States.59 While
countries often use a specific method based on the arm’s length principle,
many services and intangible assets are difficult to estimate, which leaves a lot
of room for tax manipulation;60 some think transfer pricing manipulation
problems are growing larger and becoming more prevalent.61
It is important to see how transfer pricing is a consequence of the evolution
of an organizational form that spans international borders. Early forms of the
European MNC operated in the United States prior to 1914; United States
MNCs began producing in Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s.62 It is now
common to talk about the effect of MNCs on the culture and operation of
international commerce, but we want to recognize that the kinds of
organizational cultures represented in these organizations result from the
employees’ professional backgrounds and values developed over time in such
organizations.63 Moreover, there is not just one operating organizational

57. See Claudio M. Radaelli, Game Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship: Transfer
Pricing and the Search for Coordination in International Tax Policy, 26 POL’Y STUD. J. 603, 610
(1998).
58. Catherine Hubbard, Transfer Pricing Siphons Billions in Revenues, MTC Official
Charges, 56 TAX NOTES 546, 546 (1992).
59. John Turro, Treasury Blasted Over Alleged Transfer Pricing Shenanigans, 55 TAX
NOTES 150, 150–51 (1992).
60. See Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 18 (1993).
61. Yura Sakurai, Comparing Cross-Cultural Regulatory Styles and Processes in Dealing
with Transfer Pricing, 30 INT’L J. SOC. L. 173, 174 (2002).
62. See John Cantwell, The Changing Form of Multinational Enterprise Expansion in the
Twentieth Century, in HISTORICAL STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BUSINESS 15, 24
(Alice Teichova et al. eds., 1989).
63. B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 17
(1991).
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culture for all MNCs, because culture is itself not a unitary concept.64
Essentially, the operation of these companies is diverse and varied, so the
following discussion necessarily speaks in general terms.
At one time, MNCs sought to internalize core resource or marketing
constraints, but they have moved toward new strategies for maintaining market
share in individual countries; one tactic for doing so is intra-firm trade.65
Historically, these debates over MNCs have manifested as discussions about
customs control regulation.66 Nations have historically maintained some
control over the flow of goods across their borders through the use of customs,
taxation rules, or individual tax assessments; customs duties can be a major
revenue source, so they have remained an important source of control for
countries with significant international trade.67 When tax administration is
designed to make point-of-entry collection efficient, controls allow regulation
of the flow of goods; however, over time, transfer pricing has come to
represent a source of destabilization in such countries.68
For the past three decades though, “a growing proportion of international
trade is not really trade at all but transfers within single multinational
corporations.”69 These transfers are “administered,” meaning that the prices
assigned for accounting purposes are not usually set in the marketplace
between two unrelated companies.70 That administered price may be different
from transactions that were not conducted within an MNC for the simple
reason that intra-firm or inter-company (transfer) pricing is the most important
and complex variable in orchestrating marketing and production strategies.71
Generally speaking, tax authorities tax firms based on the principles of
taxation of entire worldwide income (for residents) and taxation of income

64. See id. at 7 (discussing how there can be numerous cultures within a society).
65. Sanjaya Lall, The Pattern of Intra-Firm Exports by U.S. Multinationals, 40 OXFORD
BULL. ECON. & STAT. 209, 212 (1978) (comparing the reasons for undertaking vertical
integration to those for undertaking intra-firm trade).
66. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 63, at 39 (noting that customs duties are a major revenue
source for countries); Lall, supra note 65, at 211 (noting that some studies do not differentiate
among the underlying rationale for intra-firm trade).
67. See PETERS, supra note 63, at 39–40.
68. See G.K. Helleiner, Intrafirm Trade and the Developing Countries: An Assessment of the
Data, 6 J. DEV. ECON. 391, 391–92 (1979) (stating that transfer pricing is of great concern to
developing nations because it interferes with their ability to control the pricing flow of goods).
69. Robin Murray, Introduction to MULTINATIONALS BEYOND THE MARKET: INTRA-FIRM
TRADE AND THE CONTROL OF TRANSFER PRICING 1, 2 (Robin Murray ed., 1981) (emphasis
omitted).
70. Id. at 2–3.
See generally DAVID SOLOMONS, DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE:
MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL 160–211 (2d prtg. 1969) (exploring interdivisional product and
market relationships from various perspectives including theoretical).
71. WAGDY M. ABDALLAH, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES: DECISIONMAKING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 29 (1989).
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produced within the country (for residents and non-residents).72 Governments
often treat corporations the same as other taxable entities.73 MNCs are
therefore exposed to taxation on both sides, so they often establish separate
legal entities in each tax jurisdiction.74 While MNCs might rely on bilateral
taxation treaties between countries to provide rules that eliminate double
taxation,75 they might also engage in tax management across regimes through
the use of transfer pricing.76
Stated corporate tax rates vary greatly across countries: In 2002, the rate
was 24.5% in Switzerland, 40.0% in the United States, and 42.0% in Japan.77
Of course, effective tax rates may differ from stated rates.78 Tax authorities
want to make sure they get their “fair share” of MNC tax take,79 and they know
that firms can use transfer pricing to minimize their overall tax burden
(maximize profit).80 Of course, tax administrators have plenty of opportunities
to address efficiency and efficacy through implementation.81 In the case of
corporate taxation with regard to transfer pricing, “the actual meeting of
taxpayer and tax official will determine what the law, in practice, is for that
individual.”82 Authorities help to create a body of rulings that can be used to
enforce tax legislation and specific statutes.83 One alternative to this system
for MNCs is recourse to supranational arbitrations.84

72. Green, supra note 60, at 23.
73. See id. (noting that the definition of “person” under the Internal Revenue Code includes
corporations and similar entities).
74. Masahiro Max Yoshimura, Comment, The “Tax War” Between the United States and
Japan Under Internal Revenue Code § 482: Is There a Solution?, 12 WIS. INT’L L.J. 401, 406
(1993–1994).
75. See Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, Do Bilateral Tax Treaties Promote Foreign
Direct Investment?, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 461, 463 (Karl
P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
76. ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 30.
77. KPMG INT’L, KPMG’S CORPORATE TAX RATE SURVEY: AN INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE TAX RATES FROM 1993 TO 2006 13, 15 (2006).
78. See Don Fullerton, Which Effective Tax Rate?, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 23, 23–24 (1984).
79. John Neighbour, Transfer Pricing: Keeping it at Arm’s Length, OECD OBSERVER, Jan.
2002, at 29, 30.
80. See ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 29–30.
81. See PETERS, supra note 63, at 248 (stating that tax administrators can address the effects
of tax laws in two ways: by issuing regulations and by taking entities with questionable liabilities
to court).
82. Id. at 248–49.
83. Id. at 248.
84. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRANSFER
PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THREE TAXATION ISSUES 20 (1984) (outlining
advantages and disadvantages to instituting an inter-governmental arbitration system for transfer
pricing disputes).
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In the situation discussed in this paper, transfer pricing is the pricing of
goods and services within an MNC. It occurs when part of a corporation in
one country sells (transfers) goods or services to another part of the same
corporation in another country. The practice of transfer pricing and the
procedures by which it is carried out affects how profits are allocated within a
corporation for tax and other purposes.85 Essentially, transfer pricing attempts
to allocate profits and losses for each division in a company in a way that will
benefit the corporation’s overall strategy.86 For example, corporations also
utilize transfer pricing to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of different
divisions within the company; this aspect of transfer pricing is helpful for
business decisions such as corporate expansion.87 As such, the two divisions
of a hypothetical MNC can administer prices with several objectives in mind.
The MNC has multiple objectives such as risk pooling, improving its domestic
and international positions, exploring new markets, meeting tariff/quota
restrictions in importing countries, securing otherwise unobtainable raw
materials, exploring economic resources, manufacturing at lowest cost, and
selling in the best markets.88
Again, transfer pricing is the assignment of a non-market derived price,
usually for accounting purposes, to internal transfers of goods, services,
royalties, et cetera, within a firm. In economics, the transfer of such goods
within a corporation is still a trade.89 Internalization of such transfers helps
avoid submarkets for inputs, pool risk from the unavailability of such inputs,
and appropriate rents or profits that would have been otherwise inaccessible.90
It is important to note here that transfer pricing is not solely a MNC practice.91
Many domestic transfers within firms fall under a price-setting approach.92
Transfer pricing includes practices that assign “manipulated prices on trade
flows between units which have a common center of control (usually via a
majority shareholding).”93
A primary objective can be reducing the MNC’s overall international
corporate income tax burden. The firm can consolidate losses and profits and
administer its overall tax burden.94 This happens because MNCs operate in

85. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 29.
86. Sakurai, supra note 61, at 176.
87. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30.
88. See ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 29–30 (outlining some of the financial concerns of
MNCs).
89. Radaelli, supra note 57, at 605.
90. See ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 29, 40–41.
91. Roger Y.W. Tang, Transfer Pricing in the 1990s: The Emphasis is on Multinational and
Tax Issues, MGMT. ACCT., Feb. 1992, at 22, 24.
92. Id.
93. Murray, supra note 69, at 5.
94. Id. at 6.
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numerous countries simultaneously, and their overall corporate tax burden
varies across countries.95 It is often advantageous for MNCs to move profits
into a country with low taxes.96 Since various parts of the corporation within
different countries are under a common head of control, their profit allocation
is not entirely the result of market forces when transfer pricing comes into
play.97 A parent company can choose to pay one of its subsidiaries belowmarket prices, so the subsidiary company looks like it has a lower profit.98
Thus, there is the danger of affiliated companies within different countries
over-pricing or under-pricing their internal imports/exports to evade taxes.99
Within transfer pricing, firms must balance efficiency in generating profit and
equity in distribution.100 Transfer pricing allows a company to avoid the
problem of double taxation.101 If such trades were not internalized, that trade
would be liable to taxation.102 The taxation must assess taxes on trades that are
internal to the workings of a company, rather than internal to the market.
Because MNCs use transfer pricing to achieve profitability and profit
repatriation and avoid tax differentials, the right transfer price will help a
company penetrate a market or establish a more global market position.103 It
helps if there are markets for similar goods, but in practice MNCs distinguish
between market, cost-oriented, and non-cost-oriented transfer prices.104 Of
course, these factors are considered secondary or even ignored when the
taxation authority attempts to determine the “correct” transfer price.105
While evidence about transfer pricing remains spotty, a 1990 survey found
that 132 out of 143 Fortune 500 firms used transfer pricing for domestic
interdivisional transfers; 90 used transfer pricing for international transfers.106
A survey of the heads of thirty-nine United States-based MNCs found that
avoiding exchange controls was an important objective for a decision-

95. Id.
96. ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 30.
97. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30.
98. See id. at 29 (describing an example where a British company shows a profit but its
Korean supplier does not).
99. Id. at 29–30.
100. See id. at 29.
101. Id. at 30.
102. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 29–30.
103. See ROGER Y.W. TANG, TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN 106–07 (1979); Lawson A.W. Hunter, Q.C. & Susan M. Hutton, Where There is a Will,
There is a Way; Cooperation in Canada-U.S. Antitrust Relations, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 101, 110
(1994).
104. TANG, supra note 103, at 2–3.
105. See Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement and the Special Challenge of
Transfer Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (explaining that as far as tax authorities go,
“corporate pretensions about a global entity are simply beside the point”).
106. Tang, supra note 91, at 22, 24.
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maker.107 Evidence about the practice also comes from MNCs based outside
the United States.108 While Japanese firms often center their focus on growing
market share over maximizing short-term profits, pricing management has
become central to implementing that goal.109 However, a detailed survey of
empirical research shows that the research has failed to suggest a single
strategy for transfer pricing due to the diversity of companies’ needs.110
How should they design their own regimes to increase their take? To
avoid tax avoidance and other transfer pricing problems, the OECD developed
the “arm’s length principle,” which is found in Article 9 of the 1997 Model
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.111 The arm’s length principle
states that instead of treating two company entities as part of a large corporate
structure, transfer pricing should treat the two companies involved as two
independent unrelated companies.112 Parties to the transaction are expected to
be independent and on equal footing.113 The arm’s length principle asks
corporations to find comparable market transactions so that they can set an
acceptable transfer price.114 The purpose of arm’s length regulation is to
However, considerable regulatory
prevent transfer price distortion.115
uncertainty remains since countries, firms, and industries prefer different
applications of the arm’s length principle.116
Specifically, firms must choose one of a number of different ways of
implementing the arm’s length principle, or at least something that
approximates it. The discussion of these decisions can naturally become
technical since it describes methods of incorporating diverse allocable
principles from economics, accounting, and law. A short description of the
range of decisions helps paint a picture of the layering of these choices for
firms, tax authorities, and legal analysts. For example, in October 1988, the
Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) jointly released
“A Study of Intercompany Pricing” (also known as the Section 482 White

107. SIDNEY M. ROBBINS & ROBERT B. STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE: A STUDY OF FINANCIAL POLICY 17, 92 (Raymond Vernon ed., Harvard
Multinational Enter. Ser., 1973).
108. See generally Kenneth A. Grossberg, The Ins and Outs of Japanese Pricing Strategy, J.
PRICING MGMT., Summer 1990, at 6, 6 (discussing transfer pricing by Japanese MNCs).
109. See id.
110. TANG, supra note 103, at 21.
111. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See id. (using an example to say that transactions that allocate all the costs or all the
profits to different divisions are problematic).
115. See id. (explaining that no country wants its tax base unfairly diminished by transfer
pricing).
116. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30.
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Paper) to provide guidance about the proper allocation of income.117 The
problem of deciding on a method came down, in many instances, to the “basic
arm’s length return method” (BALRM).118 Debates about BALRM and its
place as a method (as well as more broadly in international law) followed the
release of the White Paper,119 but what is instructive about the events and the
history that followed is how difficult it is to find a single method that works in
all instances for all companies.
The problem faced under systems like BALRM (the so-called “profit split”
method) is determining:
[W]hether uncontrolled taxpayers would have agreed to the same terms, given
the actual circumstances under which the controlled taxpayers dealt. . . .
[U]ncontrolled taxpayers are deemed to exercise sound business judgment on
the basis of reasonable levels of experience . . . within the relevant industry
120
and with full knowledge of the facts.

Within four years after BALRM, the IRS essentially used four methods for
calculating the transfer price allowable under the arm’s length principle: a
comparable uncontrolled price (a market price); a resale price (a selling price,
less markup); a cost-plus price (the “unfinished” good or service, plus
markup); and a fourth set of methods (which might include profit-split,
reasonable rates of return, functional analysis, an IRS Section 482 audit, et
cetera).121 This meant that in practice firms set transfer prices in four different
ways: market-based approaches, negotiated prices, cost-based prices, and
through the use of mathematical programming models.122
The methods themselves add a layer of uncertainty. While firms have
increased use of arm’s length prices over cost-based approaches,123 and
evidence shows that approaches like BALRM tend to explain historical
prices,124 MNCs still tend to prefer methods like cost-plus or the resale

117. Daniel J. Frisch, The BALRM Approach to Transfer Pricing, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 261, 261
(1989).
118. See id.
119. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 6–7 (2007) (arguing that once you stop looking
for comparables, you are no longer engaged in an arm’s length method).
120. Alan W. Granwell & Kenneth Klein, “Objective” Tests of Transfer Pricing Prop. Regs.
Require Subjective Determinations, 76 J. TAX’N 308, 308 (1992).
121. Susan C. Borkowski, Section 482, Revenue Procedure 91-22, and the Realities of
Multinational Transfer Pricing, INT’L TAX J., Spring 1992, at 59, 60–61.
122. See id. at 60.
123. Tang, supra note 91, at 24.
124. See Jean-Thomas Bernard & Robert J. Weiner, Transfer Prices and the Excess Cost of
Canadian Oil Imports: New Evidence on Bertrand Versus Rugman, 25 CAN. J. ECON. 22, 40
(1992) (analyzing Canadian crude oil prices in light of multinational oil companies’ transferpricing practices).
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method.125 A majority of companies have found tools like BALRM difficult to
apply in practice, and so they often resort to alternative methods to resolve
disputed issues.126
These are natural ways the choice of method adds to the regulatory
uncertainty firms face. In addition, there are four other types of uncertainty.
First, the IRS must navigate an implementation environment for which
Congress lays a groundwork that may not be entirely structured. For example,
in the case of a profits-based approach to transfers of tangible property, “The
source of the Service’s authority to apply the commensurate with income
standard to tangibles is not clear.”127 As such, in general, firms must interpret
the taxation authority’s approach and how that approach fits into the bigger
political picture.
Second, the different trade frameworks value different approaches. The
position of the European Economic Community on transfer pricing is
important, as is how that framework fits into broader frameworks such as those
vetted by the OECD.128 Difficulties come when there are different prices,
differences between national laws, and different procedures.129
Third, taxation law does not move in lockstep with either international
trade laws and policies or the economics of international trade and transfers.
Notably, “[t]he nature of international trade has changed since Section 482 was
adopted, and the tax law has not kept up with changes in economic reality.”130
At the same time, international frameworks such as the OECD’s have come
closer to interpretations of the arm’s length criterion that have been offered in
the United States,131 although other countries have moved in other
directions.132

125. Anita M. Benvignati, An Empirical Investigation of International Transfer Pricing by
U.S. Manufacturing Firms, in MULTINATIONALS AND TRANSFER PRICING 193, 201–02 (Alan M.
Rugman & Lorraine Eden eds., 1985).
126. Guenter Schindler & David Henderson, Intercorporate Transfer Pricing: 1985 Survey of
Section 482 Audits, 29 TAX NOTES 1171, 1171 (1985).
127. Granwell & Klein, supra at note 120, at 314.
128. See JOHN ROBINSON, MULTINATIONALS AND POLITICAL CONTROL 9–10 (1983)
(discussing the European Economic Community’s Code of Conduct in the early 1980s).
129. See COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (CONDENSED VERSION) § 9 (2008) (discussing
differences in domestic laws, with particular emphasis on the fact that some countries “treat
partnerships as taxable units (sometimes even as companies) whereas other countries adopt what
may be referred to as the fiscally transparent approach”).
130. Robert W. McGee, Intercompany Transfer Pricing Under Section 482, J. PRICING
MGMT., Winter 1991, at 37, 39.
131. AVI-YONAH, supra note 119, at 7.
132. See Nathan Boidman, The Effect of the APA and Other U.S. Transfer-Pricing Initiatives
in Canada and Other Countries, 44 TAX EXECUTIVE 254, 257–59 (1992) (reviewing transfer-
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Fourth, there is always debate within the professional tax community over
the appropriate taxation scheme: on the treatment of intangibles,133
comparables,134 source rules,135 methods for comparisons,136 analytic
complexity,137 and subnational rules.138 The complexity of these opinions and
their implementation create a fourth source of uncertainty.
In summary, a taxation authority can adjust the declared taxable profits of
associated companies if they think those profits have been distorted because of
transactions with associated companies in other territories. Two entities are
associated in two simple cases: An enterprise directly or indirectly manages,
controls, or provides capital to another; or, the same people directly or
indirectly manage, control, or provide capital to both enterprises.139 The arm’s
length principle treats different parts of a MNC as separate entities.140 The
authority may rewrite the associated enterprises’ accounts if they do not show
the true taxable profits occurring in that country.
The firm has to find two unrelated companies that carry out comparable
transactions in the open market and use the same price as that charged between
them. There are many methods for comparing the uncontrolled transactions
between independent parties with the controlled transactions between
associated parties. Different countries have different preferences for one
method over another.141 Different firms and industries (and even different
divisions of the same firm) prefer different methods.142 This variety is a form

pricing developments in Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom).
133. See, e.g., Barbara L. Rollinson & Rom P. Watson, The New Intercompany Pricing
Regulations, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 225, 225 (1992) (discussing intangibles in transfer pricing).
134. See, e.g., Laurie J. Dicker & George N. Carlson, The Proposed Transfer Pricing
Regulations: Comments and Concerns, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 233, 234–35 (1992) (questioning an
earlier paper’s assumption that simple and complex comparables are easily categorized).
135. See, e.g., Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution
of the International Transfer Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?,
56 TAX NOTES 339, 342–43 (1992).
136. See, e.g., John Turro, Witnesses Criticize “Other” CPI At Hearing on Transfer Pricing
Regs, 56 TAX NOTES 1244, 1244 (1992) (describing multiple witnesses at an IRS hearing
disagreeing with the comparable profit interval as used in proposed section 482 regulations).
137. See, e.g., Ronald D. Marcuson, Lively Debate Marks First Section 482 Seminar, 54 TAX
NOTES 856, 857 (1992) (discussing Richard Cooper’s use of applied quantitative analysis to
question the adjustments required by section 482 regulations).
138. See, e.g., Granwell & Klein, supra note 120, at 315 (arguing that unless the United
States’ trading partners come to the same consensus on how to deal with transfer pricing, debate
and consequential double-taxation will only intensify).
139. See Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30 (posing a hypothetical of a French bicycle
manufacturer and its subsidiary, a distributor in the Netherlands).
140. Id.
141. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at i.
142. See Tang, supra note 91, at 24.
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of regulatory uncertainty: uncertainty as to whether decisions made now (based
on a particular method) will produce the expected outcome later in time (when
it may be evaluated using a different method).
Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) help reduce this uncertainty. An
APA “determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of
criteria (e.g., method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical
assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing
for those transactions over a fixed period of time.”143 APAs clarify factual
issues surrounding the proposed activities (not legal uncertainty). They are
efficient for resolving issues in one, two, or more countries simultaneously.
Firms may obtain both favorable treatment and (at least) certainty of treatment.
Governments attempt to address transfer pricing tax avoidance issues
through policy adjustments that coordinate systematic tax discrepancies across
countries.144 As outlined above, APAs are written agreements between a firm
and a tax authority that select a way to resolve transfer pricing issues in
advance of the transaction occurring.145 The APA selects the pricing methods
that will establish the arm’s length prices in future transactions. Under the
APA, pricing sources are classified as independent transactions, comparable
transactions, or similar transactions.146 A unilateral APA involves one tax
authority and a taxpayer; a bilateral or multilateral APA involves two or more
tax authorities.147 Of course, unilateral APAs place the taxpayer at risk of
transfer pricing risk in the other country since it only applies to one country.
Advantages of APAs include better prediction of costs and tax liability,
increased certainty in international tax issues, potentially reduced audit
costs,148 and reduced risk of double taxation and litigation.149 However, APAs
can be expensive and time consuming because of documentation requirements,
pre-filing conferences, and fees.150 Along with this comes the inevitable
change in how the MNC would do business without considering any transfer
pricing implications.

143. CTR. FOR TAX POLICY & ADMIN., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MANUAL
PROCEDURES 48 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/19/35/38061910.pdf.
144. Akinori Tomohara, Inefficiencies of Bilateral Advanced Pricing Agreements (BAPA) in
Taxing Multinational Companies, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 863, 863 (2004).
145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146. Robert Feinschreiber, Advance Pricing Agreements: Advantageous or Not?, CPA J.,
June 1992, at 58, 59.
147. CTR. FOR TAX POLICY & ADMIN, supra note 143, at 48.
148. Id. at 43.
149. Dylan D. Damon, To What Extent do APAs Confer Greater Certainty With Respect to
Transfer Pricing Issues?, 15 REVENUE L.J. 111, 112 (2005).
150. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at i; Feinschreiber, supra note 146, at
58, 61.
ON EFFECTIVE MUTUAL AGREEMENT
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For instance, consider the effects of domestic tax policies under a bilateral
APA on a MNC’s production decisions: While bilateral APAs prohibit income
shifting, there is still the inefficiency of distorted production.151 With this kind
of APA, the MNC and two governments agree on the same arm’s length
price.152 Given this price and tax rates, the MNC maximizes its after-tax
profits.153 But two governments that share a tax base still face a coordination
problem, which leads to a level of inefficiency.154 In this case, the MNC must
choose between this inefficiency and eliminating the segmentation between
parts of the firm and internalizing the cost of the intra-firm transaction.
Essentially, “[r]educing . . . uncertainty may require negotiated contracts where
price, volume, and terms of trade are defined.”155 Firms necessarily compare
these negotiated relationships with the choice of internal production within a
single country.
Overall, the purpose of APAs is to reduce a kind of regulatory uncertainty
that flows in the environment in which MNCs do business. In this
environment, transactions within a single firm that occur across international
borders require the construction of artificial prices so that tax authorities can
allocate profit to different parts of the company. In general, the construction of
these prices creates uncertainty for firms—unless firms can anticipate the way
in which those prices will be decided. APAs provide a measure of certainty,
because they reduce the future impact of regulation (in the form of tax
judgments) by deciding on methods and procedures in advance of financial
transactions. The next question is why some countries have decided to allow
APAs while others have not. Answering that question is the purpose of the
next section of this paper.
III. SIX EXPLANATIONS FOR WHEN COUNTRIES ALLOW APAS
Quantitative statistical research about whether and why countries adopt
policies governing these types of firm decisions is notably scarce. To date, no
statistical analysis of the rules governing the taxation of transfer pricing has
been completed. My data are drawn from how the OECD categorizes various
rules governing transfer pricing. APAs are agreements about the correct
pricing of goods and services before the firm chooses to transfer them across
national borders but within the framework of the overall multinational firm.
My core hypothesis in this study is that the adoption of such rules, which are
not uniform across countries (or even within the OECD), depends on

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Tomohara, supra note 144, at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Robert J. Corey & David T. Wilson, Negotiating Price for Long Term Relationships, J.
PRICING MGMT., Fall 1990, at 11.
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countries’ relative placement in the network of activity by MNCs and how the
state commits itself to limiting the role of the state in the activities of the
market. Together with a set of tests of alternative hypotheses, including the
broad regulatory regime, the structure of corporate tax rates, the national
dependence on corporate taxation, and the impact of the OECD, this analysis
shows that the reduction of regulatory uncertainty within the tax code is a
function of the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into and out of the
country, along with the country’s corporate income tax rate. This has strong
implications for the long-term performance of countries in markets marked by
the presence of multinational firms, as well as the tax performance of countries
competing in the global marketplace.
In this section, I describe the variables collected for the countries included
in this study. In this study, I looked at variables that could affect (directly or
indirectly) the chance that a country adopts an APA regime. My data include
evidence from forty-seven countries representing a wide variety of geographic,
social, and development attributes.156
My choice of 2005 data for adoption of an APA regime is dictated by data
availability for my other variables to ensure the causal sequencing of
dependent and independent variables. The main question here is why do some
nations allow APAs, while others do not? The data are on the existence of
formal rules allowing and governing the negotiation of APAs. These data are
obtained from a report produced by the consultancy KPMG in 2005.157
Consultancies like KPMG produce documents like the Global Transfer Pricing
Review to aid MNCs as they attempt to understand changes in transfer pricing
legislation that occur around the world.158 The consultancy’s Global Transfer
Pricing Services unit compiled data from an array of professionals employed in
the analysis of transfer pricing.159 The purpose of the review is to describe
requirements for transfer pricing compliance in a wide array of countries.160
There are forty-seven countries included in the overall analysis.161 This
includes countries from the OECD, but also extends outside that select list to
include countries from Asia and Latin America.162 Table A2, infra, shows the
full list of countries included from that document for the statistical analysis
presented below.

156. See Table A2 in Appendix A.
157. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 2. Any country that KPMG
listed as allowing these agreements, even in limited situations, or allowing equivalent agreements,
was considered a country that allowed transfer pricing agreements for purposes of this study.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 2.
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Of course, the purpose of the KPMG report is to relay a specific
consultancy’s expertise to a set of potential clients. KPMG sells the services
of over 600 professionals and their information, access, expertise, and analysis
for MNCs who are attempting to solve specific transfer pricing problems or to
develop broader strategies for investment.163 Such tactics require participation
by professionals from diverse fields, including economists, tax advisors, and
financial analysts.164 As KPMG notes, they use “knowledge of local rules and
how they interact to help member firm clients find tax-efficient pricing routes
through an increasingly complex international web of transfer pricing rules.”165
A wide array of other consultancies also provide such data, including
PricewaterhouseCoopers, who note, “A major and growing problem for the
directors of multinationals is the issue of preparing documentation to
demonstrate compliance with transfer pricing rules.”166 While there are
potential problems with the use of data from consultancies, such as errors of
omission, these data are the best available because they cover a much wider
range than those often provided by international organizations like the OECD.
In the data, 22 out of 46 countries surveyed had APAs.167 Recall that
countries with APAs have made significant efforts to reduce the uncertainty of
firms about the handling of multinational movements of goods, services and
profits. Three example countries with APA provisions are Belgium, Mexico,
and Taiwan; countries without English legal origins include Finland, Malaysia,
and Romania.168
While a full discussion of the statistical approaches used here is beyond the
scope of this paper, certain details about the data and the implications for our
inferences are important for understanding the nature of the analysis that
follows. First, in statistical terms, this is a fairly small dataset. The countries
that have APA provisions have an advantage because there, the adoption of an
APA is common. However, the size of the dataset can be a concern for
statistical analysis.169 Second, the traditional approach here is to assess the
impact of the explanations detailed below by a technique built for “either/or”
outcomes called “logit.”170 This approach can often perform poorly in the case

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at ii.
167. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 3–16.
168. Id. As of the date of data collection, Malaysia was considering adopting some
regulations, but lacked experience in APA formation. Id. at 9–10. Additionally, Finland and
Romania have a heavily-qualified process similar to the APAs, but not named as such. Id. at 5–6,
11–12.
169. J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT
VARIABLES 53 (Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Soc. Scis. Ser. No. 7, 1997).
170. See id. at 51.
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of small datasets, so it is important to assess the overall impact of the analysis
tool on the inferences being drawn.171 Third, I account for limitations in my
sample and the limited nature of my dependent variable by first estimating a
logit model, and then assessing the model’s robustness using a trimming
estimator for the linear probability model.172 Together, these issues may
impact some of the key inferences being drawn below. I next turn to a
discussion of the six explanations explored in this paper for whether countries
have APA provisions.
A.

Legal Development

The first explanation I explore centers on the country’s broad legal
development path. My measure of this development path is a dummy variable
for the origin of a country’s legal system. English origin dummies are
generated to reflect legal attributes such as judicial vs. legislative precedent,
rights to private property, and the general rights of the individual relative to the
state. In general English legal systems are coded as “1” for former colonies,
and all others are coded as “0.” Studies of the impact of English legal origins
suggest that those systems are more likely to protect the rights of capital and to
reduce regulatory uncertainty about expropriation of market rents.173 Three
example countries with English origins are Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom; countries without English legal origins include Argentina, Finland,
and Venezuela.174
Are countries with English legal origins more likely to adopt APAs? In the
KPMG data analyzed here, 34 countries do not have English origins; 17 of
those countries also allow APAs.175 Twelve countries have English origins; 5
of those also allow APAs.176 At a rough glance there seems to be little
evidence that English legal origins affect whether a given country will adopt an
APA provision.
B.

Corporate Tax Rates

The second explanation centers on the impact of corporate tax rates. My
measure of corporate tax rates is the percentage tax rate, as constructed by
171. See id. at 34–35 (discussing the varieties of studies that look at binary dependant
variables and reviewing four different methods of conducting statistical analysis under those
circumstances).
172. See generally Horrace & Oaxaca, supra note 21 (discussing limitations of linear
probability models and how to account for such problems, including use of a trimmed sample
estimator).
173. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 22, at 1131–32, 1137–39; La Porta et al.,
Quality of Government, supra note 22, at 261–62.
174. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 22, at 1138.
175. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 3–16.
176. Id.
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KPMG.177 Specifically, tax rates are measured on a scale of 0 to 100, as
measured in January 2002; the lowest rate in the data is 16, and the highest is
42.178 The three countries with the highest corporate tax rates in the data are
Sri Lanka, Japan, and Italy; the countries in the data with the lowest corporate
tax rates are Chile, Ireland, and Hong Kong.179 There is some evidence that
countries compete with one another over corporate tax rates.180
Are countries with higher corporate tax rates more likely to adopt APAs?
Figure 1, infra, shows two boxes that represent the distributions of the tax rates
for the two groups of countries: those that have APAs and those that do not.
The middle line of each represents the median tax rate for countries in that
group; the left and right lines represent (respectively) the lowest and highest
tax rates in that group. These side-by-side “box plots” show that, on average,
countries with higher corporate tax rates are more likely to have adopted
APAs. This presents a measure of evidence about this explanation, but the
statistical analysis below will show whether this evidence holds up once we
have accounted for the other five explanations.

Figure 1. Corporate Tax Rate

177. KPMG INT’L, supra note 77, at 13, 15.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Michael P. Devereux et al., Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?, 92 J.
PUB. ECON. 1210, 1231 (2008). See also KPMG INT’L, supra note 77, at 4.
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C. Tax Dependence
The third explanation centers on the impact of tax dependence: the degree
to which the central government depends on corporate taxes to fulfill
budgetary obligations. My measure of corporate tax dependence is the
percentage of all government revenue for the central government that is due to
taxes on corporations and other enterprises, as constructed by the International
Monetary Fund.181 Specifically, corporate tax dependence was measured in
2002; the data for dependence are highly skewed, which can complicate
estimation of the statistical model below, so I computed a zero-skewness log
transformation of the underlying variable.182 The three countries in the KPMG
report with the greatest corporate tax dependence in the data are Malaysia,
Colombia, and Venezuela; the three countries with the lowest dependence on
corporate taxes are Singapore, Chile, and Mexico.183 There is some evidence
that countries change their development of rule packages for managing the
economy based on their dependence on specific revenue streams, such as those
from corporations.184
Are countries with greater dependence on corporate taxes more likely to
adopt APAs? Like Figure 1, Figure 2, infra, shows two boxes that represent
distributions for those countries that have APAs and those that do not; in this
case, the distributions are for the measure of tax dependence for the two groups
of countries. As above, the middle line of each represents the median
dependence level rate for countries in each group; the left and right lines
represent the lowest and highest tax dependence levels in each group. The
side-by-side box plots reveal no differences between countries with different
corporate tax dependence levels. Countries with high levels do not appear
more likely to have adopted APAs. Again, the statistical analysis below will
show whether this pattern continues once we have accounted for the other five
explanations.

181. See generally 26 INT’L. MONETARY FUND, GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS
YEARBOOK (2002) (compiling international financial data, including total revenue, tax revenue,
and corporate taxes for each country in Table A2).
182. See G.E.P. Box & D.R. Cox, An Analysis of Transformations, 26 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y,
SERIES B 211, 213 (1964) (discussing statistical issues with a dependant variable prone to
transformation).
183. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 181, at 95, 103, 267, 280, 378, 462.
184. See Duane Swank, Politics and the Structural Dependence of the State in Democratic
Capitalist Nations, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 38, 50 (1992) (discussing the structural dependence
thesis, which says that the “the social and economic policies of all governments are
fundamentally conditioned by their dependence on the willingness of capitalists to continue to
invest”).
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Figure 2. Tax Dependence
D. Foreign Direct Investment
The fourth and fifth explanations center on the degree to which the
country’s economy is embedded in a network of activity by MNCs. There are
two primary explanations here. The first is that incoming flows of foreign
direct investment (FDI) increase the chance that a country will adopt APA
provisions. The second is that outbound flows of FDI increase the likelihood
that a country will adopt APA provisions. In the first case, FDI represents the
benefits brought by MNCs to a country; APAs are a way of sustaining inbound
FDI flows. In the second case, outbound FDI measures the network effects of
MNCs located within a country; APAs are a way of sustaining those MNCs,
and also of increasing the chances that those MNCs will repatriate profits from
another country. Theories in the study of network economics indicate that
rules like APAs sustain or dampen the likelihood of interactions in networks
like those defined by MNCs operating across national borders.185 A number of
important studies have shown the relationships between FDI and taxation
levels or policies generally.186 Are countries with greater inward-bound FDI

185. See ANNA NAGURNEY & STAVROS SIOKOS, FINANCIAL NETWORKS: STATICS AND
DYNAMICS 4–5 (Advances in Spatial Sci. Ser., 1997) (describing network theory as applied to
economics and noting that such tools can be useful in examining individual factors).
186. Mihir A. Desai et al., Foreign Direct Investment in a World of Multiple Taxes, 88 J. PUB.
ECON. 2727, 2729–30 (2004).
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flows more likely to adopt APAs? Are countries with greater outward-bound
FDI flows more likely to adopt APAs?
My first measure of FDI flows is the size of inbound FDI in a nation, as
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).187 My second measure of flows is the size of outbound FDI, also
obtained from UNCTAD.188 Both inflow and outflow are measured originally
in millions of dollars per annum, for the year 2002. Because the measures are
both skewed, I again calculated a zero-skewness log transformation. The three
countries with the greatest inward FDI in the data are the United States,
Germany, and China; the countries in the data with the lowest inward FDI are
Greece, Iceland, and Sri Lanka.189 For outward FDI flows, the three countries
with the greatest in the data are the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom; the countries in the data with the lowest outward FDI are Argentina,
South Africa, and Portugal.190
Are countries with greater inward-bound FDI flows more likely to adopt
APAs than countries with lower inward-bound flows? Are countries with
greater outward-bound FDI flows more likely to adopt? Figure 3, infra, shows
box plots for inward flows, while Figure 4 shows plots for outward flows.
Figure 3 suggests that countries with higher inward flows are more likely to
adopt APAs; Figure 4, infra, suggests the same for countries with higher
outward flows. The analysis below will test the robustness of this initial
finding.

187. Foreign Direct Investment Database, UNCTADSTAT (Sept. 17, 2010, 2:08 PM),
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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D. OECD Membership
Finally, I account for OECD membership of the countries under study
here. Are OECD countries more likely to adopt APAs? The data show that 7
out of 17 states that are not OECD members also allow APAs. Fifteen out of
29 states that are OECD members also allow APAs. As in the case of English
legal origins, the data at this point do not point to a specific effect of OECD
membership, even though (as noted above) the OECD contributed important
model rules for the treatment of transfer pricing and the choice to use APAs to
mitigate regulatory uncertainty.
Descriptive statistics for all measures are located in Appendix A in Table
A1. The list of included countries is in Table A2 in Appendix A.
IV. RESULTS
Table 1, in Appendix A, shows the results from my estimation of the three
different models’ equations, one each for the different ways of understanding
and assessing the evidence represented in the data. The fit statistics indicate
that we should accept the models as explaining more than would a naïve guess
about whether a country has or does not have APA provisions. The R2 statistic
serves as an imperfect descriptor of the percent of variance explained by the
predictors, but there is moderate explanatory power in each of the three
models.
The first important finding is that neither English legal origins nor
dependence on corporate taxes appears to be a significant predictor of the
incidence of APAs. The coefficient for English legal origins is not significant
at conventional levels in any of the three equations, nor is the coefficient for
corporate tax dependence. This is instructive: while the studies recounted
above have found varying levels of association between English legal origins
and the reduction of economic uncertainty, my analysis, using a very specific
measure of uncertainty reduction in the form of APAs, finds no association.
Similarly, while studies find varying associations between corporate tax
dependence and other tax rules, my study finds no connection. Simple reasons
for this difference are that other scholars have concentrated on single country
studies, studies of only industrialized countries, or studies of very specific
outcomes. In this sense, other studies are bound in their findings by sampling
choices, either for units of analysis or for choice of dependent variables. My
findings indicate no clear support for a direct role for English legal origins in
this case.
In contrast, I find a remarkable pattern of relationships between FDI flows
and the incidence of APAs. First, I find that inward FDI flows are associated
with greater incidence of APAs. Second, I find that outward FDI flows are
associated with greater incidence of APAs. Figure 5, infra, shows the
estimated response function for changes in the likelihood that a country has
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adopted APAs based on changes in inward-bound flows of FDI. Figure 6,
infra, shows the estimated likelihood that a country has adopted APAs based
on changes in outward-bound flows. In a nutshell, the figures show that even
though inward-bound flows have a strong effect on the chance a country has
adopted APAs, the effect of inward-bound FDI is still not strong enough to
push a country across the threshold—to move it from not having an APA to
having an APA provision. This is shown because the estimated probability
(shown on the left side of the figure) never exceeds 0.50. In contrast, outwardbound flows increase the chance that a given country will adopt APAs from
less than 0.20 (when FDI flows are low) to over 0.80 (when FDI flows are their
highest). This means that the countries that are most likely to adopt APAs are
those whose native MNCs make significant investments in other countries’
economies.

Figure 5. Effect of FDI Flows (Inward) on the
Probability of Having an APA Provision.
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Figure 6. Effect of FDI Flows (Outward)
on the Probability of Having an APA Provision
I also find that corporate tax rates are positively related to the incidence of
APAs, which indicates that higher tax rates translate into greater reduction of
regulatory uncertainty. Figure 7, infra, shows that corporate tax rates increase
the chance that a given country will adopt APAs from around 0.20 (when rates
are low) to over 0.70 (when corporate tax rates are their highest). This means
that the countries that are most likely to adopt APAs are those whose tax rates
are high, so the rates increase the likelihood that a measure of protection will
be provided to MNCs and other companies who may fear regulatory
uncertainty that comes with the transfer pricing process.
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Figure 7. Effect of Corporate Tax Rate on the
Probability of Having an APA Provision
My last set of findings represent a mixture of intuitive and counterintuitive
results.191 I first find that OECD status reduces the likelihood that a country
will have an APA regime; this goes against the presumption that the OECD’s
production of model policy for transfer pricing increases the chances that its
members will have adopted it. However, this finding is not robust. The last
column, which includes the trimming estimator, shows that once we account
for potential problems with the statistical analysis, the estimated negative
effect of OECD status disappears. However, all of the other estimated
relationships are robust to this choice. The intuitive result here is that OECD
status is at best neutral on the likelihood a given country will have adopted
APA provisions.
In summary, there is strong evidence that countries with high FDI outflows
are more likely to adopt (by a lot); weaker evidence that countries with high
corporate tax rates are more likely to adopt (but a little less); and weak
evidence that countries with high FDI inflows are more likely to adopt (but not
by much). How good is the prediction model for explaining why specific
countries choose to adopt APA provisions? In fact, the model misses a few
countries. For example, the model predicts the following countries will have
APA provisions: Finland, India, Russia, Singapore, and Sweden. Those
191. See supra Table 1.
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countries did not allow APAs at the time KPMG gathered the data in 2005.192
The following countries should not have the APA if the inferences above hold
true, but KPMG recorded that they do: Australia, Peru, Slovakia, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, and Venezuela.193
Two example countries that the prediction model really misses are Sweden
and Thailand. Sweden did not have APA provisions at the time of the data
collection.194 It does not have English legal origins.195 Its corporate tax rate is
lower than average, as is its dependency on corporate taxes.196 It is a member
of the OECD. However, its FDI inflows and outflows are both higher than
average. What compensates for high FDI inflows and still fairly high
corporate tax rates in the case of Sweden? The answer is data. Recall that the
data here are from 2005, although time has moved forward since that period.
In fact, in 2009, Sweden’s government moved forward to allow for APAs, and
those APA provisions are now in force.197 Essentially, the model predicted
that Sweden should have APAs; although it did not allow for them by 2005,
the model’s prediction still held. The data “caught up” with the prediction.
In contrast, Thailand has an APA provision.198 It has English legal
origins.199 Its corporate tax rate is lower than average, although its dependency
on corporate taxes is higher than average.200 It is not a member of the OECD.
Its FDI flows (in and out) are both lower than average. In Thailand, what
compensates for low FDI inflows? A preliminary explanation is that Thailand
had APAs in name only. While Thailand adopted APA provisions in 2002,
they were not enforced until May 2010.201 Essentially, the model predicted
that Thailand should not have had APAs, and in effect, Thailand did not have
APAs. Of course, one feature of statistical analysis is the quality of data, and
in this case, the coarse “has/does not have” distinction does not account for

192. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 3–16.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 13–14.
195. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 22, at 1138.
196. KPMG INT’L, supra note 77, at 15.
197. Advance Pricing Agreement: New Bill, KPMG.SE (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.kpmg.se/
pages/108914.html.
198. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 13–14.
199. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 22, at 1138.
200. KPMG INT’L, supra note 77, at 15.
201. PORNAPA L. THAICHAROEN & PANYA SITTISAKONSIN, BAKER & MCKENZIE, 2003 ASIA
PACIFIC TAX UPDATE: THAILAND (2003), available at http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/
EDB7F45C-3141-4CB8-9291-53E81180654D/33074/2003ThailandTaxUpdate.pdf (noting that
Thai revenue pricing guidelines are not being strictly enforced as of 2003); Thailand: Revenue
Department Issues Guidance on APA Process, KPMG (May 17, 2010), http://www.us.kpmg.com/
microsite/taxnewsflash/tp/2010/TNFTP10_29Thailand.html (noting that the Thai Revenue
Department was promoting APAs as of April 2010).
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differences in enforcement. Indeed, any of the countries represented in this
paper as having APA provisions may in fact enforce them in a variety of ways.
The general point here is that this type of prediction model is a useful
starting point for training research sights on different countries’ systems. As
this exercise indicates, two countries that the model does not correctly predict
should receive greater empirical attention. Knowing why Sweden delayed
adoption or Thailand rushed it, are useful ways of moving our knowledge of
legal innovation forward.
CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on the conditions under which governments seek to
reduce regulatory uncertainty and regulatory risk. This paper concentrates on
MNCs that seek to transfer goods and services across international borders.
Multidivisional firms often use pricing systems for the transfer of such goods
and services. The use of transfer pricing as a coordination mechanism can be
problematic when divisions engage in cross-border transactions if governments
regulate the flow of taxable revenue across borders. The typical standard is
whether the price is consistent with an “arms length” transaction.
I address the conditions under which countries adopt APAs that allow for
agreements between a taxpayer and the tax authority that a range of prices will
be recognized as “arm’s length.” The statistical model in this paper assesses
this choice using data from 2005 about whether a country’s tax authority is
authorized to negotiate binding APAs. Both inward and outward FDI flows
increase the likelihood of a country adopting an APA and, thus, reducing
regulatory uncertainty. However, the impact of FDI flows out of the country is
substantially greater than those into the country. Countries are more likely to
reduce regulatory uncertainty by adopting an APA mechanism when they have
high corporate tax rates; the impact of corporate tax rates is also substantially
higher than that for inward FDI flows.
Two themes warrant emphasis. First, the use of this kind of prediction
model supplements a broad literature that concentrates on the details of these
proposals. Those approaches are like the use of microscopes, whereas this
approach is like cartography. The usefulness of the approach shown in this
paper is that it concentrates investigatory resources on useful and interesting
cases that might have escaped targeting in the past. In the current paper,
Sweden and Thailand emerge as useful cases for additional “microscopic”
investigation.
Second, this paper returns our attention to the issue of regulatory
uncertainty. This topic has received almost cursory treatment in academic
literature, while it has spawned entire consultative careers for those who can
help firms understand and respond to changes in regulation that occur across
countries and time. Tax treatment of business processes like transfer pricing
falls into this category, although as a field, taxation policy remains distant from
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more traditional studies of regulation like those of antitrust and market
concentration. Regardless, regulatory uncertainty remains a concern, and
transfer pricing grows as a component of those views.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1: Models of Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty
Logit
Variable
English
Origins
Corporate
Tax Rate
Dependence
OECD
FDI:
Inward
FDI:
Outward
Constant
N
RMSE
Wald 2/F
Pseudo-R2/R2

OLS

Est.

SE

-1.108

0.939

Trimmed

Est.

SE

-0.174

0.154

**
0.091
-0.031
-1.453

0.053
0.038
1.010

0.841

0.301

0.436
-11.962
46

0.313
3.212

17.61
0.31

**

*
***

SE

-0.180

0.168

0.016
-0.006
-0.248

0.010
0.008
0.194

0.145

0.056

0.083
-1.660
41
0.463
5.02
0.28

0.060
0.518

*
0.015
-0.006
-0.230

0.009
0.007
0.181

0.130

0.048

0.084
-1.497
46
0.433
10.79
0.36

0.057
0.368

*

***

*
***

Est.

***

*

***

***

*

* indicates significance at better than 0.10 (two-tailed test).
** indicates significance at better than 0.05 (two-tailed test).
*** indicates significance at better than 0.01 (two-tailed test).

***

***
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
APA
English Origins
Corporate Tax Rate
Dependence
OECD
FDI: Inward
FDI: Outward

Mean
0.478
0.261
31.075
14.962
0.630
8.576
8.179

Std. Dev.
0.505
0.443
6.481
8.938
0.488
1.404
1.628
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Table A3: Included Countries
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Malaysia

Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Singapore
Slovakia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
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